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Abstract. Thomson (1995a) proved that the uniform allocation rule is the
only allocation rule for allocation economies with single-peaked preferences
that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy, one-sided population-monotonicity, and
replication-invariance on a restricted domain of single-peaked preferences. We
prove that this result also holds on the unrestricted domain of single-peaked
preferences.
Next, replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by one-sided replacement-
domination yields another characterization of the uniform allocation rule, Thom-
son (1997a). We show how this result can be extended to the more general frame-
work of reallocation economies with individual endowments and single-peaked
preferences.
Following Thomson (1995b) we present allocation and reallocation economies
in a uniﬁed framework of open economies.
JEL classiﬁcation: D63, D71
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1 Introduction
We consider the allocation of some perfectly divisible commodity in economies
with single-peaked preferences. Typical examples can be derived from rationing
(Benassy 1982) or from simple resource allocation problems; for instance the
Part of this paper was written while the author was visiting the University of Rochester. I acknowledge
the hospitality of the Department of Economics at the University of Rochester and the ﬁnancial
support of the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO). I wish to thank William
Thomson, Gabrielle Demange, and the referees for many helpful comments.86 B. Klaus
allocation of a task among the members of a team. In many real world situations
one can assume that the members of the team have single-peaked preferences over
their share in the completion of the task. Since Sprumont’s (1991) fundamental
article a wide literature has been concerned with the search for, and analysis of,
rules with socially and economically appealing properties; for a survey of this
literature we refer to Thomson (1997b). An important conclusion of this research
is that the uniform allocation rule is now accepted as the most important rule for
allocation economies with single-peaked preferences.
A natural extension of allocation economies is obtained by the introduction
of individual endowments. A reallocation problem may occur when preferences
change over time and previous allotments are converted into individual endow-
ments. Barber` a et al. (1997) study reallocation economies in the context of in-
vestment situations where natural claims or priorities may serve as individual
endowments. The extension of the uniform allocation rule to these reallocation
economies, the uniform reallocation rule, satisﬁes many desirable properties; for
a survey of this literature we refer to Klaus (1998).
In this article we introduce allocation and reallocation economies in a uniﬁed
framework of open economies as suggested by Thomson (1995b). In an open
economy agents may have individual endowments as well as a joint obligation
to, or from, the outside world. For instance, each member of a team might be
already endowed with some share of the work-load, but in addition to these
endowments the team might have to fulﬁll some additional tasks.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First we would like to contribute to a
full understanding of allocation and reallocation economies with single-peaked
preferences. Second, by helping to “complete the allocation and reallocation
picture”, we also hope to contribute to an understanding of open economies with
single-peaked preferences and facilitate future research.
We proceed from two well-known characterizations of the uniform alloca-
tion rule by Thomson (1995a,1997a). Thomson (1995a) proved that the uniform
allocation rule is the only allocation rule satisfying Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy
in allotments, one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance on
a restricted domain of single-peaked preferences. No-envy in allotments states
that no agent prefers the allotment of another agent to his own allotment. The
property one-sided population-monotonicity is a restricted version of population-
monotonicity: if the change of the population is one-sided, i.e., it does not change
an economy where there is too less to distribute into an economy where there is
too much to distribute or vice versa, then all agents initially present are affected
in the same direction, i.e., these agents all (weakly) gain or they all (weakly)
lose. Replication-invariance requires the following: if an economy is replicated,
then the replica of the allocation assigned by the rule for the initial economy
equals the allocation assigned by the rule for the replicated economy. Our ﬁrst
result is that Thomson’s (1995a) characterization also holds on the whole domain
of single-peaked preferences (Theorem 1).
Replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by one-sided replacement-
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son (1997a). The property one-sided replacement-domination is a restricted ver-
sion of replacement-domination: if the unilateral change of an agent’s preference
relation is one-sided, then the remaining agents are affected in the same direc-
tion. We show how this result can be extended to the reallocation model. Since in
reallocation situations one can interpret the individual endowments of the agents
as individual rights, we formulate the notion of no-envy for reallocation rules
in terms of trade rather than in terms of net allotments. All other properties
we mentioned before are essentially the same for reallocation rules. We prove
that the uniform reallocation rule is the unique reallocation rule that satisﬁes
Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in net trades, one-sided replacement-domination, and
replication-invariance (Theorem 3).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect.2 we introduce the allocation and
the reallocation model with single-peaked preferences in a uniﬁed framework of
open economies. In Sect.3 we extend Thomson’s (1995a) characterization of the
uniform allocation rule to the domain of single-peaked preferences. In Sect.4 we
show how Thomson’s (1997a) result can be extended to reallocation rules. In
Sect.5 we conclude.
2 Open economies, allocation economies, and reallocation economies
In this section we present allocation and reallocation economies when prefer-
ences are single-peaked in a uniﬁed framework of so-called open economies as
introduced by Thomson (1995b). For more details on allocation or reallocation
economies with single-peaked preferences we refer to the related literature as
discussed in Klaus (1998) and Thomson (1997b). Apart from Thomson (1995b),
Herrero (1998a,b) and Schummer and Thomson (1997) study open economies
with single-peaked preferences.
2.1 Open economies
There is an inﬁnite population of potential agents, indexed by the natural numbers
N. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a continuous and single-peaked preference
relation Ri deﬁned over the non-negative real numbers R+. Single-peakedness of
Ri means that there exists a point p(Ri) ∈ R+, called agent i’s peak amount, with
the following property: for all x,y ∈ R+ with x < y ≤ p(Ri)o rx > y ≥ p(Ri),
we have yP i x.1 Each preference relation Ri can be described in terms of the
indifference function ri : R+ → R+∪{∞} that is deﬁned as follows. If x ≤ p(Ri),
then ri(x) ≥ p(Ri) and either ri(x)Ii x (if such a point exists) or ri(x)=∞.I f
x ≥ p(Ri), then ri(x) ≤ p(Ri) and ri(x)Ii x (if such a point exists) or ri(x)=0 .
By R we denote the class of all continuous, single-peaked preference rela-
tions over R+ and by Rb   R the subclass of preferences Ri ∈ Rb such that
the corresponding indifference function ri is bounded, i.e., ri(0) < ∞. Through-
out the paper we assume that any subset of agents N ⊂ N is non-empty and
1 Pi denotes the strict preference relation associated with Ri and Ii the indifference relation.88 B. Klaus
ﬁnite. Then, RN denotes the set of (preference) proﬁles R =( Ri)i∈N such that
for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈ R; RN
b has a similar meaning.
Now, an open economy can be formalized as follows. Let ω =( ωi)i∈N ∈ RN
+
be a vector of individual endowments and T ∈ R be an obligation to, or from,
the outside world such that

N ωi + T ≥ 0. For short, we call T the outside
obligation. Then, we call a triple e =( R,ω,T) ∈ RN × RN
+ × R such that 
N ωi + T ≥ 0a nopen economy. Let OE
N be the class of all open economies
for the set of agents N and OE =

N OE
N be the class of all open economies.
Similarly, let OE
N
b   OE
N be the class of all open economies for N where
R ∈ RN




b .Afeasible allocation for e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N





N ωi + T.2 For any e ∈ OE
N the set
of feasible allocations is denoted by X(e). A rule is a function ϕ that assigns to
every e ∈ OE a feasible allocation ϕ(e) ∈ X(e). Given i ∈ N, we call ϕi(e)
the allotment of agent i and  ϕi(e): =ϕi(e) − ωi his allotment change. For
e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE




N ωi − T denote aggregate
excess demand for the economy e.I fz(e) = 0, then e is balanced.I fz(e) > 0,
then e is an economy with excess demand.I fz(e) < 0, then e is an economy
with excess supply.
2.2 The allocation model and the uniform allocation rule
We call an open economy e =( R,ω,T) where ω =0a nallocation economy.
The class of allocation economies for the set of agents N equals AE
N =
{e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N | ω =0 }   OE
N. With some abuse of notation, we
set AE
N = RN × R+ and denote an allocation economy by e =( R,Ω) ∈
RN ×R+ where Ω ∈ R+ is the amount of an inﬁnitely divisible commodity, the
social endowment, that has to be distributed among a group of agents N with
proﬁle R ∈ RN. Let AE =

N AE








b . Note that x ∈ X(e) implies that x ∈ RN
+ such that 
N xi = Ω.A nallocation rule is a function ϕ that assigns to every e ∈ AE a
feasible allocation ϕ(e) ∈ X(e). Obviously, for all i ∈ N, ϕi(e)= ϕi(e).
The following allocation rule, known as the uniform allocation rule, has
played a central role in the literature of fair allocation when preferences are
single-peaked.
Uniform Allocation Rule U a. For all e =( R,Ω) ∈ AE




min{p(Rj),λ} if z(e) ≥ 0,





So, in case of excess demand, each agent either receives his peak amount
or his allotment is greater than or equal to the allotment of each other agent.
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Similarly, in case of excess supply, each agent either receives his peak amount
or his allotment is smaller than or equal to the allotment of each other agent. If
the economy is balanced, each agent receives his peak amount.
2.3 The reallocation model and the uniform reallocation rule
We call an open economy e =( R,ω,T) where T =0areallocation economy.
The class of reallocation economies for the set of agents N equals RE
N =
{e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N | T =0 }   OE
N. With some abuse of notation, we set
RE
N = RN×RN
+ and denote a reallocation economy by e =( R,ω) ∈ RN×RN
+
where ω =( ωi)i∈N ∈ RN
+ is a vector of individual endowments that have to be










rule ϕ is a function that assigns to every e ∈ RE a feasible (re)allocation
ϕ(e) ∈ X(e).
Until now the “reallocation model” almost equals the “allocation model”: the
only difference is that we have a vector of individual endowments ω ∈ RN
+ instead
of a social endowment Ω ∈ R+. Since for each vector of individual endowments
ω =( ωi)i∈N ∈ RN
+ , we can interpret the sum

N ωi as a social endowment,
each allocation rule can be easily applied as a reallocation rule. However, in
contrast with the allocation model, not only the individual preferences, but also
the individual endowments can be used to discriminate between the agents. Some
of these “discriminations”, e.g., having a greater endowment than one’s peak
amount, turn out to be important in the sequel.
Let e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N. We call agent i ∈ N a demander if his endowment
is strictly less than his peak amount: he “demands” p(Ri) − ωi units of the
commodity. We denote the set of demanders by D(e). We call agent i ∈ N a
supplier if his endowment is strictly greater than his peak amount: he wants to
“supply” ωi − p(Ri) units of the commodity. We denote the set of suppliers by
S(e). We call agent i ∈ N a non-trader if his endowment is equal to his peak
amount: he favors no trade.
The following reallocation rule, known as the uniform reallocation rule, has
played a central role in the axiomatic literature of fair reallocation when prefer-
ences are single-peaked.
Uniform Reallocation Rule U r. For all e =( R,ω) ∈ RE




min{p(Rj),ω j + λ} if z(e) ≥ 0,
max{p(Rj),ω j + λ} if z(e) ≤ 0,






In case of excess demand, suppliers and non-traders receive their peak
amounts. The amount they supply is divided among the demanders so that each
of them receives in addition to his individual endowment an amount that is as
equal as possible, with each demander’s peak amount as upper bound. If the90 B. Klaus
economy is balanced, each agent receives his peak amount. In case of excess
supply, the reallocation is dual to the excess demand case: all demanders and
non-traders receive their peak amounts. The amount they demand is subtracted
from the suppliers so that each of them diminishes his individual endowment
by an amount that is as equal as possible, with each supplier’s peak amount as
lower bounds.3
2.4 Properties of allocation and reallocation rules
In this subsection we introduce several properties for allocation and reallocation
rules. It is without loss of generality that we introduce properties for rules that
are deﬁned on the whole class of open economies.
Our ﬁrst (standard) requirement for rules is Pareto efﬁciency.
Pareto efﬁciency. For all N and all e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE , there is no x ∈ X(e)
such that for all i ∈ N, xi Ri ϕi(e), and for some j ∈ N, xj Pj ϕj(e).
It follows easily that a rule is Pareto efﬁcient if and only if it is same-
sided, that is: for all N and all e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N, either [for all i ∈ N,
ϕi(e) ≤ p(Ri)], or [for all i ∈ N, ϕi(e) ≥ p(Ri)].
The next property we analyze is no-envy. No-envy can be traced back to
Foley (1967) who considers it in the context of resource allocation problems. A
rule satisﬁes no-envy in allotments if no agent strictly prefers the allotment of
another agent to his own allotment.
No-envy in allotments. For all N, all e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N, and all i,j ∈ N,
ϕi(e)Ri ϕj(e).
Because of individual endowments, in reallocation and open economies it
might make less sense to compare ﬁnal allotments only when performing a “no-
envy test”. In order to incorporate the individual endowments into the notion
of no-envy, we formulate no-envy in terms of trade or allotment changes: no
agent strictly prefers the allotment change of another agent or the part of another
agent’s allotment change that is feasible for him to his own allotment change.
Let α ∈ R. Then, α+ := max{0,α}.
No-envy in net trades. For all N, all e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N, and all i,j ∈ N,
ϕj(e)Rj (ωj +  ϕi(e))+.
So, agent j envies agent i if j prefers i’s allotment change or the part of
i’s allotment change which is feasible for him, to his own allotment change. A
concept of no-envy in terms of allotment changes—called “fair” net trade—as
3 It is worth noting that the uniform allocation rule as well as the uniform reallocation rule can
be interpreted as Walrasian solutions; see Thomson (1995b). For exchange economies with a single
commodity, the uniform reallocation rule U r is as a special case of Mas-Colell’s (1992) “Walrasian
solution with slack”.
An extension of the uniform allocation and the uniform reallocation rule to open economies, the
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introduced above was formulated by Schmeidler and Vind (1972) in the more
general context of exchange economies.
Next, we introduce the slightly weaker notion of weak no-envy in net trades:
in difference to no-envy in net trades an agent is not considered to envy another
agent if he strictly prefers the part of the other agent’s allotment change that is
feasible for him to his own allotment change while in fact the whole allotment
change of the other agent would not be feasible for him.
Weak no-envy in net trades. For all N, all e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N, and all i,j ∈ N
with ωj +  ϕi(e) ≥ 0, ϕj(e)Rj (ωj +  ϕi(e)).
So, agent j envies agent i if j prefers i’s allotment change, added to his
endowment, to his own allotment—provided the former is feasible.
Note that on the class of allocation economies AE , both no-envy properties
in net trades are reduced to no-envy in allotments. Allocation and reallocation
rules satisfying no-envy in net trades always exist. However, Thomson (1995b)
shows that on the domain of open economies no rule satisﬁes weak no-envy in
net trades.4 Thomson’s (1995b) “weak no-envy” property is a modiﬁcation of the
weak no-envy in net trades property used here.
Next, we discuss two so-called “solidarity properties” that describe the effect
of certain changes in a single parameter of an open economy while the other pa-
rameters are kept ﬁxed. If after any arrival of new agents either all agents initially
present (weakly) lose together or all (weakly) gain together, then the rule satis-
ﬁes population-monotonicity.5 If after any change of a single agent’s preference
relation either all remaining agents (weakly) lose together or all (weakly) gain
together, then the rule satisﬁes welfare-domination under preference-replacement,
or replacement-domination for short.6
Thomson (1995a,1997a) shows that for allocation rules population-monotoni-
city and replacement-domination are generally incompatible with Pareto efﬁ-
ciency and no-envy in allotments. A similar incompatibility holds for reallocation
rules; see for instance Moreno (1996) and Thomson (1995b). However, these in-
compatibilities only occur when the change in the parameter is such that it turns
an allocation or reallocation economy in which there is “too much” to divide
into an economy in which there is “too little” to divide, or vice versa. We call
a change where this does not occur one-sided. In the sequel, we consider the
one-sided versions of population-monotonicity and replacement-domination, i.e.,
solidarity among the agents is only required for one-sided changes in the initial
allocation or reallocation economy.
4 Thomson (1995b) demonstrates this result with the following example. Let e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE N
be such that N = {1,2}, p(R1)=1 ,p(R2)=2 ,ω =( 0 ,1), and T = −1. Note that X(e)={(0,0)}
and that at (0,0) agent 2 envies agent 1 for his allotment change.
5 Thomson (1983a,b) introduced population-monotonicity in the context of bargaining. For a survey
on population-monotonicity we refer to Thomson (1995c).
6 Moulin (1987) introduced replacement-domination in the context of binary choice with quasi-
linear preferences. Replacement-domination has been studied in a variety of settings and we refer the
interested reader to a recent review of the literature by Thomson (1999).92 B. Klaus
Let N ⊆ M, and R ∈ RM. Then, the restriction (Ri)i∈N ∈ RN of R ∈ RM
to N is denoted by RN.
One-sided population-monotonicity.7 For all N, ¯ N, all e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N,
and all ¯ e =(¯ R, ¯ ω,T) ∈ OE
¯ N,i fN ⊆ ¯ N, R = ¯ RN, w =¯ wN, and z(e) · z(¯ e) ≥ 0,
then either [for all i ∈ N, ϕi(e)Ri ϕi(¯ e)] or [for all i ∈ N, ϕi(¯ e)Ri ϕi(e)].
For N ⊆ M let M\N := {i ∈ M | i / ∈ N}. Let R, ¯ R ∈ RN, and j ∈ N.I f
RN\{j} = ¯ RN\{j} and Rj / = ¯ Rj, then we call ¯ R a j-deviation from R.
One-sided replacement-domination.8 For all N, all j ∈ N, all e =( R,ω,T) ∈
OE
N, and all ¯ e =( ¯ R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N,i f¯ R is a j-deviation from R and z(e) ·
z(¯ e) ≥ 0, then either [for all i ∈ N\{j}, ϕi(e)Ri ϕi(¯ e)] or [for all i ∈ N\{j},
ϕi(¯ e)Ri ϕi(e)].
As a last property we introduce replication-invariance: if an open economy
is replicated, i.e., the individual endowments, the outside obligation, and the
preference proﬁle are replicated, then the replica of the allocation assigned by
the rule for the initial economy equals the allocation assigned by the rule for the
replicated economy.
For e =( R,ω,T) ∈ OE
N, k ∈ N, and N   such that N ⊆ N   and |N  | = k |N|
we partition N   into |N| subsets indexed by i ∈ N and we refer to the economy in
OE
N such that for all i ∈ N, all of the members of the ith element of the partition
have preferences and individual endowments identical to the preferences and the
individual endowment of agent i, and in which the outside obligation equals kT,
as a k-replica of e. We use the shorthand notation k ∗ e. Given x ∈ X(e), we
similarly denote by k ∗ x the allocation obtained by k-times replicating x.
Replication-invariance. For all N, all e ∈ OE
N, and all k ∈ N, ϕ(k ∗ e)=
k ∗ ϕ(e).
The uniform allocation rule satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in allotments,
one-sided population-monotonicity, one-sided replacement-domination, and repli-
cation invariance; see for instance Thomson (1995a,1997a). The uniform reallo-
cation rule satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in net trades, one-sided population-
monotonicity, one-sided replacement-domination, and replication invariance; see
for instance Klaus et al. (1997) and Klaus (1998). Note that the uniform reallo-
cation rule does not satisfy no-envy in allotments.
3 A domain extension for a well-known characterization
of the uniform allocation rule
Thomson (1995a) proves that the uniform allocation rule is the unique allocation
rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in allotments, one-sided population-
monotonicity, and replication-invariance on the domain of allocation economies
7 See Thomson (1995a), Klaus, Peters, and Storcken (1997), and Moreno (1996).
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with bounded, single-peaked preferences AE b. We extend this result to the
larger domain of allocation economies with single-peaked preferences AE .
Theorem 1. On AE the uniform allocation rule is the only allocation rule
that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in allotments, one-sided population-
monotonicity, and replication-invariance.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in parts similar to Thomson’s (1995a) proof of
the original result on AE b. Steps 1 and 2 (a) are new. Step 2 (a) is added to
the original proof to prove the result on the larger domain AE while Step 1 is
added to facilitate Steps 2 (a) and (b).
Proof. As mentioned earlier, the uniform allocation rule satisﬁes the properties
named in the theorem. To prove the remaining part of the theorem let ϕ be an
allocation rule that satisﬁes the properties named in the theorem. Let C = {e |
and ϕ(e) / = U a(e)} and suppose, by contradiction, that C / = ∅. In Step 1, we
prove that there exists an e ∈ C such that e =( R,Ω) ∈ AE
N and |N| =2 .I n
Step 2, we derive a contradiction.
Step 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that for all e ∈ C with e ∈ AE
N, |N| > 2.
Let ¯ e ∈ C be such that ¯ e =(¯ R, ¯ Ω) ∈ AE






. Assume, without loss of generality, that ¯ N = {1,2,3,...}.
Since ϕ is Pareto efﬁcient, it follows that either z(¯ e) > 0o rz(¯ e) < 0. Assume,
without loss of generality, that z(¯ e) < 0. Since ϕ(¯ e) / = U a(¯ e), there exist agents
j,l ∈ N, without loss of generality j = 1 and l = 2, such that ϕ1(¯ e) <ϕ 2(¯ e)
and p(¯ R2) <ϕ 2(¯ e). By no-envy in allotments, agent 2 does not envy agent 1 at
ϕ(¯ e). Hence, ϕ1(¯ e) ≤ r2(ϕ2(¯ e)) < p(¯ R2) <ϕ 2(¯ e). Let g := ϕ2(¯ e) − r2(ϕ2(¯ e)).
Next, let k∗ ∈ N be such that
ϕ3(¯ e)
k∗ <g . Let e∗ ∈ AE
N
∗
be a k∗-replica of
¯ e. Then, z(e∗) < 0 and, by replication-invariance, ϕ(e∗)i sak∗-replica of ϕ(¯ e).
For i ∈ ¯ N, we call the k∗ − 1 agents in e∗ that are obtained by replicating
agent i, replica of agent i. Furthermore, we call agent i and his (k∗ −1) replica,
agents of type i.9 Starting from e∗, we successively delete all k∗ agents of type
3. By Pareto efﬁciency and no-envy in allotments, agents of the same type always
receive the same allotment. In order to keep the notation simple, while we delete
some of the agents of type 3, we denote an allotment of any remaining agent of
type i ∈ ¯ N by ϕi(·).
First, we delete agent 3 from the economy e∗. Denote the economy that is
obtained by e1 ∈ AE
N
∗\{3}.B yPareto efﬁciency and one-sided population-
monotonicity, for all i ∈ N ∗\{3}, ϕi(e1) ≥ ϕi(e∗)=ϕi(¯ e). The largest allotment




k∗ <g ,b y
no-envy in allotments, ϕ1(e1) ≤ r2(ϕ2(¯ e)) <ϕ 2(¯ e) ≤ ϕ2(e1). Hence, e1 ∈ C .
Next, let e2 denote the economy that is obtained by deleting another agent of
type 3. Similarly as before, it follows that e2 ∈ C . By successively deleting
all k∗ agents of type 3, we obtain an economy ek
∗
∈ C that is a k∗-replica
9 If for agents i,j ∈ ¯ N, ¯ Ri = ¯ Rj, we partition the replicas of i,j such that there are exactly
(k∗ − 1) replica of each agent and k∗ agents of each type.94 B. Klaus
of ˜ e =(¯ R ¯ N\{3}, ¯ Ω) ∈ AE
¯ N\{3}. Hence, by replication-invariance, ϕ(ek
∗
)i sa








. This is a contradiction.






(a) Assume, without loss of generality, that ¯ N = {1,2}. Since ϕ is Pareto
efﬁcient, it follows that either z(¯ e) > 0o rz(¯ e) < 0. Assume, without loss of
generality, that z(¯ e) < 0 and, by no-envy in allotments, ϕ1(¯ e) ≤ r2(ϕ2(¯ e)) <
p(R2) <ϕ 2(¯ e). Let g := ϕ2(¯ e)−r2(ϕ2(¯ e)). Let k∗ ∈ N be such that
ϕ2(¯ e)
k∗ <gand




of ¯ e. Then, z(e∗) < 0 and, by replication-invariance, ϕ(e∗)i sak∗-replica of
ϕ(¯ e). Starting from e∗, we successively delete all k∗ − 1 replicas of agent 2.
Denote the resulting economy by ˆ e ∈ AE
ˆ N. By the same arguments than in
Step 1, it follows that ϕ1(ˆ e) ≤ r2(ϕ2(¯ e)) <ϕ 2(¯ e) ≤ ϕ2(ˆ e). After the k∗ − 1
replicas of agent 2 left the economy, the extra amount (k∗ − 1)ϕ2(¯ e) has been
distributed among the agents of type 1 and agent 2. Hence,
ϕ2(ˆ e)=ϕ2(¯ e)+[ ( k∗ − 1)ϕ2(¯ e) − k∗(ϕ1(ˆ e) − ϕ1(¯ e))].
Note that ϕ1(ˆ e)−ϕ1(¯ e) ≤ r2(ϕ2(¯ e))−ϕ1(¯ e). By the construction of k∗ it follows
that k∗(r2(ϕ2(¯ e))−ϕ1(¯ e)) < (k∗ −1)ϕ2(¯ e)−ϕ2(¯ e). Hence, k∗(ϕ1(ˆ e)−ϕ1(¯ e)) ≤
k∗(r2(ϕ2(¯ e)) − ϕ1(¯ e)) < (k∗ − 1)ϕ2(¯ e) − ϕ2(¯ e) and
ϕ2(ˆ e) >ϕ 2(¯ e)+[ ( k∗ − 1)ϕ2(¯ e) − ((k∗ − 1)ϕ2(¯ e) − ϕ2(¯ e))]
> 2ϕ2(¯ e).
Next, we add agent j / ∈ ˆ N such that p(¯ Rj)=p(¯ R2) and ¯ Rj ∈ Rb. Denote the
resulting economy by ˜ e ∈ AE
˜ N. Note that z(˜ e) < 0. By Pareto efﬁciency
and one–sided population-monotonicity, for all i ∈ ˆ N, p(¯ Ri) ≤ ϕi(˜ e) ≤ ϕi(ˆ e).
By Pareto efﬁciency and no-envy in allotments, agents 2 and j receive the same
allotment at ˆ e. So, because ϕ2(ˆ e) > 2ϕ2(¯ e), ϕ2(˜ e) >ϕ 2(¯ e). Thus, ϕ2(˜ e) > p(¯ R2)
and ϕ1(˜ e) <ϕ 2(˜ e). Hence, ˜ e ∈ C .
(b) Note that rj(p(¯ R1)) < ∞ and p(¯ R1) ≤ ϕ1(˜ e). Let g∗ := ϕ2(˜ e)−r2(ϕ2(˜ e)).
Let k∗∗ ∈ N be such that
ϕj(˜ e)
k∗∗k∗ <g ∗ and (2k∗ − 1)ϕj(˜ e) > k∗∗k∗(rj(ϕj(˜ e)) −
ϕ1(˜ e) )+( rj(p(¯ R1)) − ϕj(˜ e)). Let e∗∗ ∈ AE
N
∗∗
be a k∗∗-replica of ˜ e. Then by
replication-invariance, ϕ(e∗∗)i sak∗∗-replica of ϕ(˜ e). Starting from e∗∗,w e
successively delete all k∗∗ agents of type 2 and all k∗∗ − 1 replicas of agent j.
Denote the resulting economy by ˇ e ∈ AE
ˇ N. Note that there are k∗∗k∗ agents
that are either direct replica of agent 1 or replica of replica of agent 1. With a
slight abuse of terminology, consider all these agents as agents of type 1. By
the same arguments than in Step 1, it follows that p(¯ R1) ≤ ϕ1(ˇ e) ≤ rj(ϕj(˜ e)) <
ϕj(˜ e) ≤ ϕj(ˇ e) ≤ rj(p(¯ R1)). After the k∗∗ agents of type 2 and all k∗∗ −1 replica
of agent j left the economy, the extra amount (2k∗−1)ϕj(˜ e) has been distributed
among the agents of type 1 and agent j. Hence,
ϕj(ˇ e)=ϕj(˜ e) + [(2k∗ − 1)ϕj(˜ e) − k∗∗k∗(ϕ1(ˇ e) − ϕ1(˜ e))].Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited 95
Note that ϕ1(ˇ e) − ϕ1(˜ e) ≤ rj(p(¯ R1)) − ϕ1(˜ e). By the construction of k∗∗ it
follows that k∗∗k∗(rj(p(¯ R1)) − ϕ1(˜ e)) < (2k∗ − 1)ϕj(˜ e) − (rj(p(¯ R1)) − ϕj(˜ e)).
Hence, k∗∗k∗(ϕ1(ˇ e) − ϕ1(˜ e)) ≤ k∗∗k∗(rj(p(¯ R1)) − ϕ1(˜ e)) < (2k∗ − 1)ϕj(˜ e) −
rj(p(¯ R1)) + ϕj(˜ e) and
ϕj(ˇ e) >ϕ j(˜ e) + [(2k∗ − 1)ϕj(˜ e) − (2k∗ − 1)ϕj(˜ e)+rj(p(¯ R1)) − ϕj(˜ e)]
> rj(p(¯ R1)).
Hence, in contradiction to no-envy in allotments, p(¯ R1) ≤ ϕ1(ˇ e) and ϕj(ˇ e) >
rj(p(¯ R1)) ≥ rj(ϕ1(ˇ e)) ≥ p(¯ Rj).    
Remark 1. It has not been known whether replication-invariance is independent
from the other properties in Thomson’s (1995a) characterization (Theorem 1 re-
spectively). Similarly, the independence of replication-invariance from the other
properties in the following theorem (Theorem 2) by Thomson (1997a) has been
an open problem. The answer to both questions is given in Klaus (1997) by
means of a single allocation rule, unequal to the uniform allocation rule, that sat-
isﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in allotments, one-sided population-monotonicity,
one-sided replacement-domination, but not replication-invariance.
Theorem 2 (Thomson, 1997a). On AE the uniform allocation rule is the only
allocation rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in allotments, one-sided
replacement-domination, and replication-invariance.
4 A new characterization of the uniform reallocation rule
As stated in Theorem 1, the uniform allocation rule is the only allocation
rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in allotments, one-sided population-
monotonicity, and replication-invariance. A similar result, proven by Klaus et al.
(1997) and Moreno (1996), is true for reallocation rules: the uniform reallocation
rule is the only reallocation rule that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, weak no-envy in
net trades, and one-sided population-monotonicity.10 The reason why replication-
invariance is not needed when extending Theorem 1 to the reallocation setting
is that replication-invariance for reallocation rules is implied by Pareto efﬁ-
ciency, weak no-envy in net trades, and one-sided population-monotonicity: using
one-sided population-monotonicity, we can “replicate” any economy by adding
“clones” of the original agents that have the same preferences and the same
endowments. By weak no-envy in net trades and Pareto efﬁciency, each of the
cloned agents and the original agent receive the same allotments, which, by one-
sided population-monotonicity and Pareto efﬁciency must be the same as in the
original economy. Note that we cannot replicate an allocation economy (and most
open economies) by “adding agents”.
The following theorem can be seen as an extension of Theorem 2 to the
reallocation model.
10 A stronger version of the theorem that is based on a weaker one-sided population-monotonicity
condition can be found in Klaus et al. (1997) and Klaus (1998).96 B. Klaus
Theorem 3. On RE the uniform reallocation rule is the only reallocation rule
that satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in net trades, one-sided replacement-
domination, and replication-invariance.
The proof of Theorem 3 is in parts similar to Thomson’s (1997a) proof of the
original result on AE (Theorem 2). However, extra difﬁculties in the proof for
the reallocation model are caused by possibly negative allotment changes (par-
ticularly in the context of no-envy in net trades). Thomson (1995b, Theorem 4)
conjectures that the uniform reallocation rule is the only rule that satisﬁes Pareto
efﬁciency, weak no-envy in net trades, one-sided replacement-domination, and
replication-invariance. After the proof of Theorem 3 we show that this conjec-
ture is not true and it is not possible to weaken no-envy in net trades in Theorem 3
to weak no-envy in net trades (Example 1).
Proof. As mentioned earlier, the uniform reallocation rule satisﬁes the properties
named in the theorem. To prove the remaining part of the theorem let ϕ be a
reallocation rule that satisﬁes the properties named in the theorem.
Let e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N, and suppose, by contradiction, that ϕ(e) / = U r(e).
Since ϕ is Pareto efﬁcient, it follows that either z(e) > 0o rz(e) < 0. Assume,
without loss of generality, that N = {1,2,...,n} and z(e) < 0. Since ϕ(e) / =
U r(e), there exists an agent j ∈ N such that p(Rj) <ϕ j(e) and  ϕj(e) >
 U r
j (e).




all i ∈ N, ωi = ω 
i = ω 
n+i and Ri = R 
i = R 
i+n. Clearly, e  is a 2-replica of
e. Hence, by replication-invariance, for all i ∈ N, ϕi(e)=ϕi(e )=ϕn+i(e ).
Particularly, it follows that p(Rj) <ϕ j(e ) and  ϕj(e ) >  U r
j (e ).
Let ¯ R ∈ RN∪N
 
be a j-deviation from R  such that p(R 
j)=p(¯ Rj) and
0 ¯ Pj ϕj(e ). Let ¯ e =( ¯ R,ω ) denote this one-sided change of e . Since p(¯ Rj)=
p(¯ Rn+j) and ω 
j = ω 
n+j,b ysame-sidedness and no-envy in net trades, it follows
that ϕj(¯ e)=ϕn+j(¯ e). Suppose that ϕj(¯ e) <ϕ j(e ). Hence, ϕn+j(¯ e) <ϕ n+j(e ) and,
by same-sidedness and one-sided replacement-domination, for all i ∈ N\{j}∪N  ,
ϕi(¯ e) ≤ ϕi(e ). Then, by feasibility, it follows that

N∪N   ω 
i =

N∪N   ϕi(¯ e) < 
N∪N   ϕi(e )=

N∪N   ω 
i. This is a contradiction. Similarly, the assumption,
ϕj(¯ e) >ϕ j(e ) yields a contradiction. Hence, ϕj(¯ e)=ϕj(e ). Thus, by same-
sidedness and one-sided replacement-domination, for all i ∈ N\{j}∪N  , ϕi(¯ e)=
ϕi(e ). Hence, ϕ(¯ e)=ϕ(e ). Then,  ϕj(¯ e) >  U r
j (¯ e) and by feasibility, there
exist k ∈ N\{j}∪N   such that  ϕk(¯ e) <  U r
k (¯ e). By same-sidedness, this can
only be the case if p(¯ Rk) < U r
k (¯ e) and  U r
k (¯ e) = min{ U r
i (¯ e) | i ∈ N ∪ N  }.
Thus,  ϕk(¯ e) <  U r
k (¯ e) ≤  U r
j (¯ e) <  ϕj(¯ e). So, in contradiction to no-envy
in net trades,( ωj +  ϕk(¯ e))+ ¯ Pj ϕj(¯ e).    
Example 1. The following reallocation rule ˜ ϕ satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, weak no-
envy in net trades, one-sided replacement-domination, and replication-invariance.
If e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N such that z(e) < 0, and for all i ∈ D(e), ωi = 0, then
˜ ϕ(e)=






S(e)(ωi − p(Ri))) if i ∈ D(e).Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited 97
For all remaining N and e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N,˜ ϕ(e)=U r(e). ♦
We conclude this section with the independence of the axioms in Theorem 3.
The reallocation rule ˜ ϕ described in Example 1 satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency,
one-sided replacement-domination, and replication-invariance, but not no-envy
in net trades.
Example 2. The following no-trade rule ϕ0 satisﬁes no-envy in net trades, one-
sided replacement-domination, and replication-invariance, but not Pareto efﬁ-
ciency. For all N and e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N, ϕ0(e)=ω. ♦
Example 3. The following absorbing agent reallocation rule ϕ˜ a is similar to the
absorbing agent allocation rule ϕa introduced in Klaus (1997). It satisﬁes Pareto
efﬁciency, no-envy in net trades, and one-sided replacement-domination, but not
replication-invariance. Let e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N be such that z(e) < 0 and there
exists j ∈ D(e) such that p(Rj) > Ω
2 and ωj = 0 (such an agent j must be unique).
Then, for this economy we obtain ϕ˜ a(e) from the uniform reallocation U r(e)b y




and subtracting this amount as equally as possible, with the agents’ peak amounts
as lower bounds, from the uniform reallocation sharesU r
i (e) of the agents i ∈
N\{j}. In order to formalize ϕ˜ a, let R  ∈ RN be a j-deviation from R such that
p(R 
j)=p(Rj)+˜ a(e). Then, ϕ˜ a(e): =U r(R ,U r(e)).
For all remaining N and e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N, ϕ˜ a(e): =U r(e). ♦
Example 4. The following rule ˜ ϕ˜ a is a variation of the absorbing agent rule ϕ˜ a.
It satisﬁes Pareto efﬁciency, no-envy in net trades, and replication-invariance,
but not one-sided replacement-domination. Let e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N.I fz(e) < 0
and there exists j ∈ D(e) such that p(Rj) > Ω
2 and ωj = 0, then ˜ ϕ˜ a(e): =ϕ˜ a(e).
If e is a k-replica of an economy ¯ e ∈ RE
¯ N such that z(¯ e) < 0 and there
exists j ∈ D(e) such that p(Rj) > Ω
2 and ωj = 0, then ˜ ϕ˜ a(e)i sak-replica of
ϕ˜ a(¯ e).
For all remaining N and e =( R,ω) ∈ RE
N,˜ ϕ˜ a(e): =U r(e). ♦
5 Conclusion
In this article we present allocation and reallocation economies in a uniﬁed frame-
work of open economies and add two results to the existing literature on fair
allocation and reallocation. Apart from adding new results, a fundamental under-
standing of results for allocation and reallocation economies will be helpful for
future research on open economies. The incompatibility of no-envy in net trades
with feasibility on the domain of open economies shows that the extension of
results for allocation and reallocation economies to open economies might not
be straightforward. Apart from Thomson’s (1995b) paper, some results for open
economies with single-peaked preferences can be found in Herrero (1998a,b) and
Schummer and Thomson (1997).98 B. Klaus
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